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THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 



BY 

SAYILLA ALICE ELKUS, Ph.D. 



ARCHIVES OF PHILOSOPHY 

EDITED BIT 

FBEDEBICK J. E. WOODBBIDGE 



NO. 1, SKPTEMBEK, 1907 



DISSERTATION 

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 

of Doctor of Philosophy under the Faculty of Philosophy, 

Columbia University 



NffW YORK 
THE SCIENCE PRESS 

190T 



*««r** 



4S9595T 



THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 



BY 



SAVILLA ALICE ELKUS, Ph.D. 



ARCHIVES OF PHILOSOPHY 

EDITED BY 

FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE 



No. 1, September, 1907 



DISSERTATION 

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 

of Doctor of Philosophy under the Faculty of Philosophy, 

Columbia University 



NEW YORK 

THE SCIENCE PRESS 

1007 







Press or 

The New era printing Company 

Lancaster, pa. 



INTRODUCTION 

In the various attempts to render an adequate description of the 
world of experience as presented in the history of thought, we find 
recurring such conceptions as purpose, teleology, final cause, design, 
to denote certain features which have been deemed indispensable to 
an exhaustive interpretation of reality. Upon reflection it appears 
that these categories and their like constitute so many variants of 
the wider concept of control; and as such express specific ways in 
which control has been apprehended. That is, these different predi- 
cates are diverse methods of explaining control, of making explicit 
elements thought to be involved in its postulation. 

In the present essay, I propose to examine various typical con- 
ceptions of control as expressed or implied in the respective theories 
of philosophy, with the view to determine in what facts or ultimate 
assumptions these conceptions have their basis. To the same end 
the investigation will consider the concept of control as involved in 
the fundamental principles of the science of biology and in the 
formulations of mechanical explanation. 

The historical treatment of the subject falls naturally into two 
main divisions, distinguished, in one way at least, by their methods 
of approaching philosophical problems. These divisions are occu- 
pied with the metaphysical and epistemological discussions, respect- 
ively, the latter including the theory of pragmatism. 

Since the science of biology, in its explanation of organic nature^ 
has employed certain categories generally regarded as peculiar to 
its subject-matter, the third section will consider the notion of con- 
trol as involved in the characteristic principles of biology. Finally, 
mechanism, which formulates the principles obtaining in inorganic 
nature, or the physical world, will be treated in the fourth section. 

A comparison of the results obtained from these various sources 
will serve to manifest those characteristics common to all the con- 
ceptions, and at the same time indicate the ground of any peculiar 
features deemed essential to the category. Such an analysis of the 
data presented will seek to determine those elements of the concep- 
tion which may be retained as justifiable, and those which must be 
rejected as unwarranted by experience; those factors which are 
purely gratuitous, and those which are the outcome of a logical 
demand. 



in 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION iii 



CHAPTER I 

COSMOLOGICAL 

The concept of control as a thesis of the philosophical movement expressed 
in the theories of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus 
— The thesis in the fragments of Heraclitus — Empedocles, Anaxagoras 
and Democritus— The concept indicated in the ' Dialogues ' of Plato — 
The concept in the philosophy of Aristotle— Stoicism— Scholastic philos- 
ophy not occupied with the question of control— The concept in the 
philosophy of Spinoza— The concept in the philosophy of Leibniz— Com- 
parison of the concepts in the cosmological theories 1 

CHAPTER II 

EPISTEMOLOGICAL 

The epistemologies of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant concerned with the 
locus of control; these writers give speculative accounts of the teleolog- 
ical aspect of nature— Locke's position with respect to control in 
epistemology; his theory of design in nature — Berkeley's theory of con- 
trol and design— Hume's position with respect to control— Kant's theory 
of control; his conception of purpose in nature— The concept of control 
in pragmatism 19 

CHAPTER III 

BIOLOGICAL 

The concept as revealed in the peculiar categories of biology 29 

CHAPTER IV 

MECHANISM 

The concept in the method and constructions of physical science 34 

CHAPTER V 

CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS 

Comparison of all the conceptions which have been discussed— Purpose and 
mechanism two diverse ways of describing control— Application of the 
concept in the sciences of mechanics, economics, sociology 39 



IV 



THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 
CHAPTER I 

COSMOLOGICAL 

The philosophical movement embodied in the theories of Hera- 
clitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus may be interpreted 
as one of which an important function is the expression of the recog- 
nition of the concept of control in description and explanation of 
the world, and the discovery of such conditions as permit its affirma- 
tion. This movement accepts as a primary datum of experience 
general flux or change, and superimposes the further reflection that 
the change is regulated, that it is not merely change ; its method may 
be comprehended. For the detailed exposition of this interpretation 
we must have recourse to the respective theories of the philosophers. 

Heraclitus, purporting to render an analysis of the world of 
experience, maintains as his grand discovery that in addition to the 
flux of sensible things there exists a principle of a different nature. 
Fragments 1 25, 26, 41 and 42, 43, 44, 62, proclaim the existence of 
universal change ; while in contradistinction fragment 1 announces : 
". . ., tv 7ravra etvat " (all things are one) ; there is connection of 
these diverse sensible things. For the elucidation of this phrase 
we must turn to what Heraclitus deems his unique contribution. 

Fragment 18 states: " Of all whose words I have heard, none 
has attained to this, to know that wisdom (a-o<j>6v) is from all things 
separate." As to the nature of this wisdom, different from all 
things, fragment 19 asserts : ' ' Wisdom is one, to know the thought 
(yvwfxrjv^ by which all things are steered through all things." 

That is, this yvui^-q (thought, intelligence) is a principle 'steer- 
ing,' directing the sensible flux, existing in the dynamic world and 
perceptible to intelligence or wisdom (<ro<j>ia). As to the specific 
characteristics which have afforded the ground for the observation 
of the existence of this yvwfx-q in all things, we learn that there is 
order preserved in the events, there is regulation of the happenings ; 
the manifold is a cosmos. (Indicated in Fr. 20) : "This order 
(koV/xov) which is the same in all things, no one of gods or men has 
made ; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be, an ever-living fire, 
fixed measures of it kindling and fixed measures going out." (Also 
indicated in Fr. 28, 29, 61.) 

1 Bywater, ' Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae.' 

1 



2 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

All diversity constitutes one process (Fr. 24, 35, 36, 39, 40, 57) 
by means of a principle of connection called harmony (d/a/xovi^) , 
whose essence is the holding of differences together, the combining 
of two opposites into one. (Indicated in Fr. 45, 46, 56, 59.) 

The general thesis of this doctrine of Heraclitus may be sum- 
marized as follows: The world of continuous flux is described as 
a cosmos; succession is restrained, order and regularity must be 
attributed to it. Such a process can be comprehended only in terms 
of the principle by which it is controlled. This principle is not 
itself subject to the flux, but it exists as a static factor inherently 
in the process it controls or regulates. It is designated yvwfxrj 
(thought, purpose), since it is the permanent alone which is intel- 
ligible, it is by virtue of the existence of control that we can under- 
stand; the changing constitutes the incomprehensible. 

In the systems of Empedocles and Anaxagoras there is expressed 
the conviction that the world presented in immediate knowledge 
is one stage in a continuous process, where method is dominant. 
Thus Empedocles: " For know that all things have understanding 
(<j)p6v7]o-Lv) and their share of intelligence." 1 

What is, is somehow an embodiment of what was, and what will 
be, is somehow contained in what now exists. To account for the 
world of different objects, of controlled movement, is the problem 
of these philosophers. Hence they first proceed to maintain that 
change in the sense of absolute origination and annihilation is unreal. 

Empedocles : ' ' There is no origination of anything that is mortal, 
nor yet any end in baneful death; but only mixture (/xet£ts) and 
separation (o\oAAa£i?) of what is mixed, but men call this 'origina- 
tion' (<£v<ns)." 2 

Anaxagoras: "For nothing comes into being, nor yet does any- 
thing perish, but there is mixture and separation of things that are. ' ' 3 

To explain the character of all change and the existence of 
distinct objects, unchanging and eternal elements must be posited. 
Empedocles names four of these original elements, the four roots 
(pt^w/xaTa) of all things, — fire, air, earth, water; and as causes of 
their movement, two others, love and hate, which are combining and 
separating forces. In addition, there is introduced a principle of 
measure in the mixture of elements; reason (Xoyos) governs the 
peculiar proportion of parts which determines the different objects. 4 
Anaxagoras maintains that there is an infinite number of the perma- 

X A. Fairbanks, 'The First Philosophers of Greece/ p. 186, line 231. 

2 hoc. cit., p. 162, line 36. 

3 hoc. cit., p. 244, Fr. 17. 

4 Arist., 'De Part. An./ I., 1. 642, a 18. 



C0SM0L0G1CAL 3 

nent existences, the seeds ( a-n-ipfWiTa ) of all things, originally together. 
vova- (mind), an external element, produces motion in the mixture 
and directs the course of movement, resulting in the world of dis- 
tinct objects. "And whatever things were to be, and whatever 
things are, as many as are now, and whatever shall be, all these mind 
arranged in order." 1 

Democritus is impressed with the same fact of an ordered world 
and is likewise confronted with the same problem— the explanation 
of such a world. The extent to which he has surpassed his predeces- 
sors in the superiority of his conception is evidenced in the embodi- 
ment of his formulation in the mechanical theory, which, in its main 
outlines, constitutes the modern physical theory. Similar to Empe- 
docles and Anaxagoras, he posits permanent elements as the primary, 
necessary hypothesis for all explanation. But the nature of these 
elements is such that, granted their existence, all other conditions 
may be subsequently deduced. No external forces such as love and 
hate and mind are necessary to cause and regulate movement; the 
atoms suffice for all these functions. 

Concerning the nature of these atoms, we are informed that they 
are infinitely small, indestructible, homogeneous, impenetrable bodies, 
alike in essence, but different in size and form. They are endowed 
with perpetual motion ( dtSio? Ktvqo-Ls ) , whose direction is guided by 
no disparate principle, but is due to a principle immanent in the 

atoms. Thus : ' ' katTtov Tiva Kivrjaiv koli ti's 17 Kara <f>vaiv avrwv klvtjctls ' ' 

(and there is a certain movement of those primary bodies which is 
a natural movement). 2 

The void (tokcvov), for Democritus, is the logical consequent of 
the self-moving atoms, since to render possible motion thought is 
obliged to conceive the void. 

Thus in the doctrine of Democritus is manifested the position 
that thought, in its endeavor to attain explanation, is compelled to 
postulate permanent elements in self-regulated motion (the atoms). 
With this postulate granted, all subsequent constructions are neces- 
sary deductions, thereby presenting a system logical throughout, a 
system which constitutes the essence of explanation. 

Summarizing, then, the import of the theories of Empedocles, 
Anaxagoras and Democritus, we obtain the following: An inspection 
of these theories carries with it the recognition that the same 
problem inspires them all. A world, the constitution of which is 
described in the first instance as dynamic, must in addition be char- 
acterized as a process imbued with order, or as a movement con- 
trolled. To explain this regulated world-movement there is assumed 

1 Fairbanks, loc. cit., Fr. G. 

2 Arist., ' de Calo,' III., 2-300 b. 



4 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

in every case the existence of permanent elements in motion. In the 
theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the regulating principle is 
embodied in elements other than the ones affected, while according 
to Democritus the movement is determined by the static properties 
of the atoms. In all the doctrines, however, the guiding principle 
is a constituent factor of the world, but the explanation of Democ- 
ritus holds its superiority in being natural as well as cosmic, in 
contrast to the artificial account necessitated by the character of the 
elements in the theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. 

This conclusion accords, then, with the doctrine of Heraclitus, 
in holding that explanation of the cosmos demands the existence of 
a permanent element determining the world change ; which principle 
is contained immanently in the series of events it controls. 

In Plato's doctrine of 'ideas' the existence of the rational is so 
emphatically affirmed that to it alone is attributed the status of the 
real. The flux of sensible experience, the immediate, the particular, 
is relegated to the realm of mere becoming (y«Wis), of mere appear- 
ance. Antithetically, the ideas are eternal, universal, immutable, 
are manifested to reason alone and constitute the realm of real being 
(owia). Sensible objects are real only in so far as they 'participate' 
in the nature of the ideas. With the problem of the relation of 
these two spheres we are not here concerned. 

A second feature of the ideas, and one which is no less emphatic- 
ally intimated, is that of their connection and dependence. The 
relationship of subordination among ideas is essential to their exist- 
ence and to the existence of the universe. Conceptions of measure, 
harmony, symmetry, order and law occupy a superior position in 
the structure of the world, and everywhere exhibit their dominion. 
Finally, supreme among ideas, the highest of all abstractions, the 
principle of the harmonious relationship of ideas, and thus of all 
'being,' reigns the 'idea of the good.' 

Thus in the 'Republic' the ideas are designated as 'fixed and 
immutable principles . . . neither injuring nor injured by one 
another, but all in order moving according to reason.' 1 That is, 
there is a dominating conception which preserves the subordinate 
conceptions in their ordered harmony, a highest rational principle, 
the condition of all rationality ; this is that which is termed the idea 
of the good. What light is to the visible object, the indispensable 
condition and cause of its visibility, so the idea of good, being abso- 
lute, is the principle necessary to the existence of all knowledge and 
truth. It is absolute science itself, attained by 'dialectic,' which is 
the culminating abstraction of reason. Conceptions of number, 

1 Book VI., translated by B. Jowett. 



COSHOLOGICAL 5 

harmony, order, may be said to be contained in it, for they are sub- 
servient to this organizing principle, while it in turn is the primary 
condition of their being. Hence the importance which is attached 
to the studies of number and calculation in the Platonic scheme of 
knowledge. Mathematical conceptions are essentially conceptions 
instrumental to fixedness and order ; they maintain diverse elements 
within their respective limits and thus are conducive to the unity 
of the whole. 

Evinced under a different aspect, but corresponding to the ideal 
good in the 'Republic,' 1 is the supreme principle of 'measure' in 
the 'Philebus. ' Plato conceives measure as the principle of sym- 
metry, which is due to the regulated proportion of elements in com- 
bination, and thus may be identified with beauty. The first rank in 
the scale of goods is assigned to measure. For the greatest good in 
the world is to be sought, not in pleasure, not in wisdom, but in the 
'mixture' of elements, and above all in the proportion of the mix- 
ture. Measure is identical with the principle of their ordered mix- 
ture. The universe is an embodiment of this principle of measure, 
for 'there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate 
limit, as well as a cause of no mean power which orders and arranges 
years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and 
mind. ?2 This infinite factor which enters into the composition of 
the cosmos is controlled by the principle of measure so that 'the 
assertion that the mind orders all things is worthy of the aspect of 
the world, and of the sun and of the moon and of the whole circle 
of the heavens.' 

In the 'Symposium' the supreme principle is revealed under the 
guise of beauty. The object of all love or impulse is the beautiful, 
and the object of the highest passion is absolute beauty, the prin- 
ciple of all concrete beauties. Beauty is the result and the condition 
of the harmonious arrangement of constituents. It is the source of 
the balancing influence of proportion ; it is the principle of harmony, 
of order, and is identical with the ideal good. 

In Plato's suggestion of a probable cosmological theory/ it is 
plainly evident that he is governed by the necessity of giving such 
an explanation of the origin and structure of the world as will 
primarily account for its organized character, for the adjustment 
of its parts to a consistent whole. This universe is constructed after 
the eternal, intelligible pattern. Harmony, beauty, order, law, must 
be predicated of it. Hence a 'world soul,' or supreme organizing 

1 Books VI., VII. 

2 ' Philebus.' 
8 Loc. cit. 

* ' Timaeus.' 



6 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

principle, is the source of its origination. This is a world reason 
(vovs), and is cognizable to reason alone. As the human soul directs 
the movements of the body, so this world soul or reason controls all 
occurrence in the cosmos and is the final cause of its existence. 
Briefly, the intent of this cosmological theory is the expression of 
the intelligibility of the universe, of the fact that it presents fea- 
tures which manifest a general subjection to regulation. 

To recapitulate: While the Platonic dialogues present no at- 
tempt at a systematic world theory, the general theme of the doctrine 
of ideas, as indicated above, is the insistence upon the recognition 
of the universal prevalence of determination of all things, of the 
existence of principles regulating becoming or occurrence. These 
directing principles are intelligible and immutable, as distinguished 
from the sensible and alterable. They in turn are subordinate 
features of one supreme regulating .principle. That is, the world 
must be affirmed a system, not a chaos; there is a controlling ele- 
ment, perceptible to reason alone, obtaining in the world of diversity, 
which renders it a unity, an organization. Since the nature of the 
sensible and changeable is entirely distinct from the immutable, this 
controlling principle in a sense appears to be outside the process it 
dominates. 

Aristotle, in his inquiry concerning the fundamental nature of 
reality, recognizes as the most apparent and immediate presentation 
of experience the perpetual change of sensible things. But reflec- 
tion can not pause at this incomplete analysis. Reality is not a 
series of unrelated particulars ; it is an organic unity in which indi- 
viduals function uniquely in the totality. "If there were nothing 
besides sensible things, there would be no principle (^pxv)i no order 
(Tail's), no generation (yeWis), no celestial harmony." 1 Science is 
an indubitable possession and bears witness to the intelligible, sys- 
tematic character of the cosmos. To discover the ultimate condition 
of such an organic unity, to demonstrate the existence and nature 
of the permanently real (ovo-t'a), which is implied in its structure, 
is the problem of the 'Metaphysics.' 

The primary reality (ova-ta ) is always manifested in the concrete 
individual and constitutes its essential nature ( to tl ty elvat ) . On 
the other hand, it must be emphasized that an adequate conception 
of the essential nature of a thing necessitates a transcendence of 
any particular embodiment, to the universal character manifested 
in a process (Ku/770-is). Individuals are subject to production 
(y(Wis) and annihilation (<f>0opd), and the essential nature of the 
individual can only be apprehended under genetic conditions. 

1 ' Metaphysics,' W. Christ, Ed., Book A, Chap. 10. 



COSMOLOGICAL 7 

What, then, is generation and destruction, what are the character- 
istics of a process, are questions which must be considered. 

Every concrete individual is the result of a union of matter 
(vA.77) and form (elSos). Matter, the sum of conditions necessary to 
the actuality of the individual, is indeterminate. Form (elSos) 
is that which defines the indeterminate matter (vAr?) and in com- 
bination with it results in the existence of the concrete individual 
(to o-vvoAov). All existence is necessarily individual. Neither mat- 
ter nor form can originate, nor can they cease to exist; the pre- 
existence of both is indispensable to the realization of the thing. 
It is the concrete individual ( t6 <tvvo\ov) only, that which is com- 
posed of both, which can originate and perish. Now all change 
implies that which is the subject of change, that which subsists 
during differences, that which is permanent,— in a word, matter 
(vXrj). Matter is capable of being both of two contraries, but at 
different times. Thus we have attained the conception of the pri- 
mary real (ovo-ia) as the essential nature (to tl tjv emu) of the indi- 
vidual, which is only manifested in a process. It must be noted 
that while the essential nature (to tl rjv thai ) is universal, it is 
embodied in the particular; while it is static, it is contained in the 
dynamic. 

Further, movement or change does not occur indiscriminately, 
but is characterized by certain limitations evinced in its operations. 
4 ' Nothing, indeed, is moved by chance. ' n This is the import of the 
doctrine of potentiality (o\W/ms) and actuality (evcpyeta), which is 
of fundamental significance in the apprehension of reality. Exist- 
ence may be either potential or actual. A thing is said to exist 
potentially, when upon the event of certain conditions its realization 
or actual existence will take place. Matter (v\rj) is potentiality 
(Sum/xis), since it is the condition of the actuality (evcpyeia) of a 
thing. It is indeterminate in so far as its potential existence may 
or may not be transformed into actual existence, but it is a deter- 
mining factor in limiting the nature of the actual in case of its 
realization. Thus, a seed is a plant in potentiality. For if the seed 
realizes its nature, that is, if appropriate conditions are forthcoming, 
the seed must develop into a plant and into nothing but a plant. 
The plant in relation to the seed, the potential (owa/u?), is actuality 
(cVcpyoa). It is evident that actuality (evcpyeia) must be prior to 
potentiality. For while the seed, from which the specific plant is 
produced, must have existed prior to this plant, there must have 
existed another plant prior to the existence of the seed, from which 
it was generated. Thus it is only in the case of the particular 
individual that the potential may be said to exist previously to 

1 hoc. cit., Book A, Chap. 6. 



8 TEE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

the actual. Generically, actuality (cVepyeta) must exist prior to 
potentiality (8wa/us), prior in every sense of the term, in time, in 
knowledge, and in essence (ova fa) 9 for the actual must always define 
the merely potential. 

Aristotle has previously predicated the eternal character of move- 
ment, on the ground that if movement or change were not perpetual, 
something would have to be produced from nothing,— which is in- 
conceivable. Linked to the deduction of the eternal character of 
movement and a consequent of it, is the affirmation of the eternal 
character of time. 

With the establishment of the conception of reality as a per- 
petual process, Aristotle has arrived at the final and ultimate stage 
of the inquiry: What is the fundamental condition of such a 
process? What is the final cause of the world order? All move- 
ment and change imply that which is capable of originating move- 
ment, for if movement were not produced by something it would 
have to arise from nothing. This cause of movement must exist in 
operation (ivepyaa) ; for if it were merely capable of producing 
movement, but did not operate, it would not account for movement. 
It must not contain any potentiality (Swa/us) in its nature; other- 
wise its operation would not necessarily be eternal. 'There must, 
therefore, be a principle, whose very nature (ova fa) is operation 
(cvepyeta),' 1 and which must be without matter, since it is eternal. 
Thus far we have derived the existence of something which is moved, 
and something which is the cause of movement. But, * ' Since there 
is something which is moved ( t6 Kivovpevov) and something which pro- 
duces movement (to /avow), there must be an intermediate term; 
that is, there is something which produces movement without itself 
being moved, something which is eternal, and both existence 
(ova fa) and operation (ivepyeia)." 2 Aristotle's next consideration is 
the nature of this primary reality (ovo-ta), this eternal first mover, 
with the resulting conclusion that it is reason (vovs). That is, this 
unmoved mover operates in a manner similar to that in which the 
desirable and the intelligible cause movement, for that which is 
desired is always an intelligible object. Again, the desirable must 
be identified with the good, for we always desire a thing because it 
is good, and do not deem it good because we desire it. And the 
principle of will is, therefore, the good itself. Now, it is admitted 
that the best thing in the world is intelligence. The object of 
intelligence is the final cause, and this it is which is the cause of all 
movement and determines it as that which is loved. This mode of 
existence is life, ' for the operation of intelligence is life and the first 

1 ' Metaphysics,' Book A, Chap. 6. 

2 hoc. cit., Book A, Chap. 7. 



COSMOLOGICAL 9 

reality (ovo-ta) . ' The Deity is eternal life. Further, what must be the 
content of this divine thought? If this supreme intelligence (vo^o-is) 
is the best thing, it can only have for its object the best; but the 
best is thought itself, therefore it must think itself. Its operation 
is the seizing of itself by itself (vo'^o-t? votjo-cws), self -contemplation. 

Thought and its object are identical. Nor can this object change, 
for, being the best, if it changed it would cease to be the best. It is 
therefore perpetual self-contemplation. This mode of life, which is 
the eternal possession of the divine reason, is only enjoyed by man 
in rare moments of speculative thinking. Since all things in the 
universe exhibit a striving for realization, a tendency toward an 
end, in all things is this principle immanent, although in different 
degrees, varying from the lowest type of existence, that of inorganic 
being, through the intermediate phases of plant and animal life, 
reaching its culmination in the rational life of man and, peculiarly, 
in speculative thinking. 

The way in which the universe contains this principle is com- 
parable to the relation of a general to his army, or to the organiza- 
tion of a well-regulated household. The general is the cause of the 
order in the army, and the principle of organization is the condition 
of the regulation of the household. That is, the universe contains 
this principle as the cause or condition of its unification. For while 
all things in the universe exercise their distinctive functions, 'all 
conspire to a unique result' 1 The self-realization of the individual 
is identical with the process of the whole. 

Gathering up the results of the whole investigation, the essential 
points of interest to our study present themselves as follows: The 
preeminent category demanded in an adequate interpretation of the 
universe is that of a world reason (voSs), which is evoked to explain 
the regulated or controlled aspect of reality. The data which have 
led to this induction, also the particular factors which the argument 
finds to be involved in the category, may be briefly stated as follows : 
Starting with the admission that the paramount empirical fact of 
the universe is change, a subsequent observation compels the ac- 
knowledgment of the existence of order in variation, of organic 
connection between events. These two primary assumptions, change 
and characteristic alteration, or method, lead inevitably to the con- 
ception of reality as a perpetual process, an eternal activity. The 
question then resolves into : What is the final cause, the ultimate 
ground, of this determinate world movement? The inquiry dis- 
covers it to be : The continuous operation of a principle which, while 
itself static, controls dynamic nature. Its method of operating is 
similar to the mode in which the object of desire, the intelligible 

1 hoc. cit., Book A, Chap. 10. 



10 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

object, determines human action; it influences as a goal to be at- 
tained, as an end to be realized. It is not an entity coercing from 
without, but is contained in the movement, contained peculiarly as 
an end toward which it tends, as an attraction to which it is impelled, 
as a result for which it is making. Now all individual things mani- 
fest a tendency toward self-realization, and all are constituent 
elements of the world process. The whole is a unity of its move- 
ments. That is, the determining principle, the static, universal 
element of reality, is identical with the tendency toward self-realiza- 
tion essentially characterizing all particular existences. 

The metaphysics of the stoic philosophy proceeds from the thesis 
that reality is corporeal in nature and is limited to sensible existence. 
The corporeal must be defined with reference to a dynamic stand- 
point; force or tension (twos) is its essential character. It presents 
a twofold aspect: the real is that which acts (r6 irovovv), and that 
which may be acted upon (to irdo-xov). Corresponding to this double 
aspect of the corporeal there exists the difference of finer and coarser 
in its nature. The finer substance, called fire, ether, air, atmos- 
pheric current (Trvefyia), is described as mind, soul, reason; and the 
coarser is termed matter. But the finer is conceived as everywhere 
interpenetrating the coarser, and hence ultimately must be viewed 
as identical with it; reason is in all things and inseparable from 
them. God is described as both the active force and the subject 
acted upon, or these looked upon in union with each other. 

The world must be considered as a series of events and their con- 
sequences bound together by an irresistible necessity, every occur- 
rence of which is in conformity with this necessary order. Hence, 
the original productive force is called a 'generative reason' (Aoyos 
o-n-epiMiTLKos ) ? for it contains within itself the ground of the develop- 
ment of the whole world into its ordered multiplicity. It is 'a 
reasonable God or an artistic fire ( irvp rexvixov) , proceeding accord- 
ing to a certain method to the production of the world. n The fixed 
order which governs the course of events, or necessity, is denoted 
by the conception of destiny or fate (elfMtpfxevrj) . It must be ob- 
served that this necessity ruling all existence is no transcendental 
principle operating from without, but, consistent with the stoic 
materialism, is inseparable from the natural force and must be iden- 
tified with it. 

To account for this necessary character of the world movement, 
for the universal causal series of events, which maintains the ele- 
ments of the world in perfect balance, and is thus the ground of 
the whole order and unity, the conception of 'Providence' (wpoVoia) 

1 H. Diels, 'Doxographi Graeci/ Plac. 1. 7. 33, p. 305. 



COSMOLOGICAL 11 

originated. The cause of this destined order is possessed of fore- 
sight of everything. 1 That is, with the view to the end to be at- 
tained, Providence has foreseen and foreordained the whole process 
whose method is comprehended in the notion of destiny. 

The perfection of the world system is, according to stoicism, 
almost too obvious to be in need of supporting arguments. Among 
such, however, is included the acknowledged adaptation of life to 
environment. 

The summary of the position sketched above may be presented 
as follows: Stoicism maintains that the world must be described as 
a fixed order of events, the regulated character of which involves 
the existence of a guiding principle, whose divination of the end 
determines the character of the process. That is, supervening upon 
the conception of a definite movement of events, there is the concep- 
tion of foreordained control. We find no basis for this idea of 
predestination other than the existence of absolute order, perfection. 
A preview of the end is thought requisite to control. 

The period dominated mainly by scholastic philosophy had little 
need to occupy itself with inquiry into the nature of control. Since 
it was accepted as certain, upon authority superior to human reason, 
that the world was the creation of a divine spirit, its orderly struc- 
ture presented no problem. Since the ruler of the universe created 
and directed all things with the view to a particular end to be 
accomplished, logical effort was concerned chiefly with the task of 
making the facts of nature fit in this revealed truth, rather than 
with the search for truth itself. 

Conspicuously in the history of philosophy, Spinoza explicitly 
rejects final causes on the ground that they are inapplicable to 
reality. The philosophical fallacy of referring this category to 
the universe consists not merely in a failure to denote any ultimate 
feature of the world, but is in direct conflict with the fundamental 
position upon which an adequate construction must rest. 

In Part I. of the 'Ethics' 2 Spinoza has exposed at length the 
origin of this misconception and the ground of its falsity. This 
is effected with such force and simplicity that I venture to quote 
a major portion. He says: "All such opinions spring from the 
notion commonly entertained that all things in nature act as men 
themselves act, namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as 
certain that God himself directs all things to a definite goal. ..." 
As to the reason why men arc so prone to adopt this opinion, he 
continues: "It ought to be universally admitted that all men are 

1 Diog. L., VII., 14!). 

2 Appendix, translated by R. II. M. EClwes. 



12 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

born ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the desire to 
seek for what is useful to them, and that they are conscious of such 
desire. Herefrom it follows that men think themselves free inas- 
much as they are conscious of their volitions and desires and never 
even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed 
them so to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for 
an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they 
seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge 
of the final causes of events, and when these are learned, they are 
content as having no cause for further doubt. If they can not learn 
such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to 
considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced 
them personally to bring about the given event, and thus they neces- 
sarily judge other natures by their own. ... As they look upon 
things as means, they can not believe them to be self-created; but 
judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for 
themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the 
universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and 
adapted everything for human use . . . but in their endeavor to 
show that nature does nothing in vain, i. e., nothing which is useless 
to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, 
and men are all mad together." 

In essence this contention asserts in the first instance that the 
ascription of final causes to nature is an anthropomorphic procedure, 
a projection of human methods of activity to a field where no evi- 
dence for such methods exists. Moreover, this is not all. The 
source of this error is to be traced to a total misconception of the 
nature of human volition. For that which constitutes the determin- 
ing cause of actions is not a definite end, in the sense of an external 
goal, but directly the contrary is the case; the controlling cause of 
action is embodied in the impulse which leads to the action. "By 
the end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean an impulse 
(appetitus) .' n Now it is consciousness of this impulse, combined 
with ignorance of the efficient cause of action, which gives rise to 
the notion of freedom in the sense of determination by an inde- 
pendent end, by an extraneous agency. Hence the conclusion results 
that final cause reduces to 'nothing else but human desire, in so far 
as it is considered as the origin or cause of anything.' 2 Therefore, 
in all departments of nature, human as well as non-human, final 
cause turns out to be a ' mere human figment. ' 

To disclose the ground for this conclusion, to comprehend the 
conception which must replace that of the traditional final cause— 

1 ' Ethics/ Part IV., Def. 7. 
2 Loc. cit., Part IV., preface. 



COSMOLOGICAL 13 

the opinion that the processes of nature are determined by an 
external agency acting according to a preconceived end— against 
which his polemic is directed, it is necessary to consider Spinoza's 
metaphysical theory. 

Efficient causality, universally predicable of things, is the initial 
presupposition upon which any attempt to comprehend the universe 
must take its point of departure. Organized knowledge exists, and 
implies the dependence of everything upon some other thing. In 
the adaptations of individual things to each other, expressed in the 
laws of nature, is presented evidence of such connection. 1 This 
fundamental premise is expressed by Spinoza in the statement, 
' ' There is necessarily for each individual thing a cause why it should 
exist." 2 While the key to the comprehension of this regulated 
character of events implied in universal efficient causation is dis- 
covered in the proposition, " Nothing in the universe is contingent, 
but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular 
manner by the necessity of the divine nature." 3 

That is, this determination of things can only be understood on 
the supposition of the world as a unitary system the elements of 
which contribute to and are dominated by the nature of the whole, 
'the necessity of the divine nature.' The individual elements, being 
determined by other elements, are finite. The whole, that which 
can have no external determination, is independent. Hence the 
significance of 'substance' or God to account for this unity, the 
whole. "By substance I mean that which is in itself and is con- 
ceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception 
can be formed independently of any other conception." 4 With this 
conception of substance established, the regulated character of events 
is to be comprehended when they are conceived as following from 
the nature of the whole by an inevitable or 'geometrical necessity.' 
In Spinoza's terminology, "Individual things are nothing but modi- 
fications of the attributes of God or modes by which the attributes 
of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. ' ' 5 

But this whole, this unity, is a whole of constituent parts. The 
controlling principle of events is not an extraneous agency super- 
posed upon them, but has its being immanent in the individual 
things. Moreover, according to Spinoza it is this very factor which 
constitutes the essential nature of an individual thing. Every indi- 
vidual thing is composed of two elements ; of the finite or conditioned 

1 Letter XXXII., Van Vloten and Land, Ed. 

2 ■ Ethics/ Part L, Prop. VIIL, Def. 3. 

3 Loc. cit., Part L, Prop. XXIX. 

4 Loc. cit., Def. 3. 

5 Loc. cit., Part I., Prop. XXII., Cor. 



14 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

and of the necessary, eternal (out of time relations). In so far as 
it is individual and a member of the temporal series, it is determined 
by other individuals (by transient causes). Everything, in so far 
as its essence is concerned, is eternal, expressive of its universal 
nature, its immanence in the whole. 

This essential, universal, static nature of a thing is expressed in 
the conatus or tendency to persist in existence. For it must be 
granted that all things manifest this striving for self-maintenance, 
this principle of inertia. "Everything, in so far as it is in itself, 
endeavors to persist in its own being. ' n 

"The endeavor or tendency (conatus) wherewith everything en- 
deavors to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual 
essence of the thing in question." 2 "When evinced in man the 
conatus or tendency toward self-realization embraces all forms of 
human effort and is called impulse (appetitus). "Desire (cupid- 
itas) is merely impulse (appetitus) accompanied by the conscious- 
ness thereof. ' ' 3 

Thus it is shown that the determinate aspect of the world is the 
result of, or rather is identical with, that characteristic of all things 
which is designated a tendency toward self -maintenance, self-realiza- 
tion. This it is which constitutes the static element in the temporal, 
finite order. This it is the function of reason to perceive, while to 
imagination is allotted the perception of things in their spatial and 
temporal relations. 

Now have we arrived at the conception which must replace the 
rejected final cause, whose inconsistency with this interpretation of 
reality is clearly apparent. 

Recapitulation. The presupposition of a dynamic world de- 
scribed by efficient causality necessitates for its ultimate compre- 
hension the determination of all events or objects. The guiding 
principle of the cosmos is evinced in all things as a tendency toward 
an end. The end can not be conceived as an external goal, but must 
be characterized a self-realization. Otherwise expressed— there is 
in everything that which makes for what is beyond itself, but is 
intended, or to an extent involved, in its present existence. It is 
this immanent direction of change, this static element in all the 
variety of events, which lies at the basis of the controlled aspect of 
nature. 

To Leibniz, imbued as he was with the results of modern scien- 
tific investigation, the fundamental philosophical problem presents 

1 Loc. cit., Part III., Prop. VI. 
2 hoc. cit., Part III., Prop. VII. 
*Loc. cit., Part III., Prop. IX., note. 



COSMOLOGICAL 15 

itself as the necessity for showing that the mechanical conception of 
cosmic processes requires for its ultimate comprehension the teleo- 
logical view of nature. Reason can recognize no infringement upon 
the universal application of the mechanical theory in the perceptible 
world, the world of matter and motion, in which the actions and 
reactions of things permit formulation. But the order of events 
so described is not ultimately apprehended. The mechanical con- 
ception of nature is not self-explaining, but demands for its com- 
pletion a further interpretation. Thus Leibniz asserts that he has 
found the means of harmonizing the opposition of mechanical and 
metaphysical systems in his discovery 'that in the phenomena of 
nature everything happens mechanically but at the same time meta- 
physically, but that the source of the mechanical is in the meta- 
physical. ' 

The perceptible world must be regarded as a phenomenal world, 
whose inner content and real nature must be conceived as force, 
activity, life. The dynamic, as contrasted with the static, given in 
physical description, constitutes the essential nature of things. And 
the doctrine of the 'monads,' which Leibniz has advanced to the 
end of disclosing the ultimate ground of the phenomenal world, 
is a theory of force, activity. In anticipation of the theory, we 
may note that the notion of 'force,' 'activity' as employed by 
Leibniz is equivalent to self-originated change, and that in essence 
the monadology may be interpreted as a theory of regulated move- 
ment or change. To make good this position we must have recourse 
to the doctrine in some detail. 

The ultimate elements of things, or simple substances, are units 
of force to which extension does not pertain. These forces or 
'monads' are the real atoms of nature, and are original and inde- 
structible. 1 Every monad is an individual, is distinct from all 
others, and is incapable of being influenced by anything extraneous, 2 
'for the monads have no windows through which anything could 
come in or go out.' Extended bodies are the phenomenal effects 
produced by aggregates of monads; only the effects of force are 
perceptible. Now all created beings, and consequently the monads, 
are by their very nature subject to continuous change. 3 But in 
addition to the fact of change, there is a method of change, that is, 
a principle controlling the series of occurrences. 4 This is the signif- 
icance of denoting the monads as characterized by 'perception' and 
'appetition.' 

1 ' Monadology/ § 1-7. 
2 Loc. cit., §2-9. 
*Loc. cit., § 16. 
*Loc. cit., § 12. 



16 TEE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

For change is such that it involves an unchanging element, a 
static factor. There is a principle of unity, of connection, in the 
plurality of states or representations of the monads which consti- 
tutes it one monad. Hence force, or the intensive nature of things, 
manifests itself in 'perception.' "The passing condition which in- 
volves and represents a multiplicity in the unity or in the simple 
substance is nothing but what is called 'perception.' 9n This unify- 
ing principle is also designated ' representation, ' it is an ideal concep- 
tion; that is, it is no phenomenon divulged in the material, per- 
ceptible world as such, but rather constitutes an intelligible prin- 
ciple. Thus every monad at every state contains the whole world 
in the sense that it 'mirrors the world.' 

Further, the principle of change is determined in its operations. 
There is a particular order in the succession of states of the monad. 
Force is evinced in ' appetition, ' 'desire.' "The activity of the in- 
ternal principle which produces change or passage from one percep- 
tion to another may be called appetition." 2 Now this determining 
principle is spontaneous, for the monads can not be affected from 
without. "Each carries in itself the law of the continuation of the 
series of its operations." 3 This self -active principle is evinced as a 
tendency to pass from one state or representation to another, and 
this tendency is directed toward the self -development of each monad. 
But Leibniz must account this controlling principle in each monad 
as one principle in all nature. So each monad is potentially the 
whole universe and its process of unfolding its inner nature is iden- 
tical with the process of realizing the universe. Appetition ex- 
presses this tendency to self-realization. Since each monad repre- 
sents the same universe, its differentiation is due to the fact that 
ix is a particular phase of representation, a particular point of view ; 
that is to say, it is a certain degree of intensity of the world force. 

But by definition the monads exclude mutual influence. How- 
ever, the material world to be interpreted is a realm where recip- 
rocal interaction is the law, and there must be a unity as the 
ground of the whole. Confronted with the problem of explaining 
the correspondence in the functions of the monads, the problem of 
accounting for the whole from the standpoint of the individual, 
Leibniz resorts to the further hypothesis of a ' preestablished 
harmony.' Each monad has been so determined originally that 
spontaneous activity bears the character of a part in a whole. Its 
natural and independent development appears to be that of an 
element in a system. The final cause or origin of this relation of 

1 Log. cit., § 14. 
2 Loc. cit., § 15. 
3 Letter to Arnauld, 1690, Erdmann Ed., p. 107. 



COSMOLOGICAL 17 

preestablished harmony is an uncreated substance, a central monad 
or God. "God, alone, is the primary unity or original simple sub- 
stance of which all created or derivative monads are products. ' n 

From the above sketch, we conclude that the import of Leibniz's 
teleological conception may be summarized as follows : The me- 
chanical theory of the Avorld demands for its ultimate interpretation 
the conception of reality as a process, a specific activity, a controlled 
change. The determination of the course of events is inherent in 
the constituent elements ; it is manifested as a tendency in all things 
toward a result. The description of the method of occurrence as 
a self-development of things, as an unfolding of a specific content, 
is a mode of expressing this tendency or determinate variation. 
The function of the doctrine of preestablished harmony is the estab- 
lishment of the identity between the cosmic principle and the self- 
determination of individual things. 

"With the theory of Leibniz we must conclude our investigation 
of the cosmological conception, since with this system terminates 
any extensive interest in metaphysical inquiry. Henceforward 
philosophical effort is influenced by the problem of method, and the 
question of cosmical control is either totally abandoned or relegated 
to a minor position in systematic thought, 

A review of the various cosmological conceptions of control which 
have been presented discloses certain salient points of agreement. 
The two primary assumptions from which all the theories take their 
point of departure are, first, the fact of a dynamic world and r 
secondly, a feature which is not so readily apparent to observation 
and which in the earlier theories is indefinitely designated as order, 
regularity, harmony, etc., while in the modern accounts it is more 
precisely described in terms of efficient causality or of the mechanical 
theory. To explain this characteristic of the world change it is 
deemed necessary to conceive nature a course of events which is de- 
termined, in a word, a process. The requirements of logic demand 
that the controlling principle be contained immanently in the series 
of occurrences which it influences. It is a universal in the particular 
elements, a static existence in the dynamic flux. In the doctrines of 
Aristotle, Spinoza and Leibniz (most thoroughly of Spinoza) there 
is exposed the mode in which this principle exists as a factor 
immanent in the world it constitutes a process. In all individuals 
is it manifested as a tendency to something beyond immediate exist- 

1 ' Monadology,' § 47. 



18 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

ence, and by virtue of this relation effecting conservation gives to 
what would otherwise be discrete happenings the character of results. 
On the other hand, there is discovered the view, peculiar to cer- 
tain theories (Platonism, stoicism, scholasticism), which locates the 
source of cosmic control in an external principle. In stoicism and 
scholasticism this foreign agency operates by means of a precon- 
ceived end. The justification for this opinion has been discussed. 



CHAPTER II 



EPISTEMOLOGICAL 



Beginning with Locke, with whom the central interest of phi- 
losophy is transferred to epistemology, conceptions of control assume 
a different status. Now metaphysics as the field for the solution of 
philosophical problems is abandoned. A theory of knowledge is the 
only road to the desired goal. If thought would be purged of the 
inconsistencies with which it had been permeated during the domin- 
ion of scholasticism, a new method of procedure must be followed. 
An inquiry into the possibilities and limitations of knowledge must 
prelude a search for truth. With the rise of epistemology and its 
fundamental assumption of dual existences, there emerges the prob- 
lem of explaining the principle of connection at the ground of the 
world order from this altered standpoint. With experience and 
knowledge conceived as a relation of some sort between a psycho- 
logical or mental existence on the one hand and an objective or cos- 
mic reality on the other, there is introduced the question as to the 
locus of the unifying principle and its consequent characteristics. 
If all knowledge is ultimately derived from sensations, and if sensa- 
tions as the merely particular are incapable of supplying the prin- 
ciple of connection involved in the complexities of knowledge, then 
mind, a subjective activity, must in some way be the source of the 
synthesis. Thus in the theories of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and 
Kant, in varying degrees and modes mind is held to furnish the 
principle of control underlying the world system. For without this 
principle the world would have to be conceived a chaos. 

On the other hand, these writers also display an interest in the 
teleological conception of nature. But having placed control in 
epistemology, they were compelled, in the consideration of design in 
nature, to resort to speculative accounts. 

Locke's position with respect to the source of unification is in- 
definite. Starting from the initial presupposition that the objects of 
knowledge are confined to ideas, and further that all ideas are trace- 
able to sensations which in their first appearance are separate or 
detached, Locke vibrates between an internal and external principle 
as the origin of their combination into the complexities of knowl- 
edge. Now the source of synthesis is attributed to the operation of 
a subjective activity, mind. Knowledge is defined as 'the perception 

19 



20 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

of the connection and agreement or disagreement of any of our 
ideas.' 1 Again, the principle of combination is referred to an ex- 
traneous, metaphysical source variously denoted as substance, the 
Deity, nature, when knowledge is asserted to be dependent upon the 
agreement of ideas with ' things without the mind.' 2 But the in- 
terpretation which influenced the development of thought imme- 
diately after Locke is the doctrine that the subjective activity origi- 
nates the arrangements of knowledge out of sense-derived ideas. 

When Locke comes to account for the purposeful aspect of 
nature, his position is a reconciliation of reason and theology and 
inclines to the deistic conception of God and what is known as the 
physico-theological argument or the argument from design. This 
view maintains that there is a mind outside of nature, an intelligence 
and will directing it according to a preconceived plan. According 
to Locke, the existence of God, a supreme will and intelligence, is an 
inference based upon the nature of the world and of ourselves. Of 
our own existence we have an intuitive knowledge, and of things a 
sensible knowledge. Locke accepts without question the order and 
regularity apparent in the world, and on the basis of the contingency 
of our own existence infers the existence of God. Thus, the argu- 
ment runs: Since our own minds are dependent and not self -pro- 
duced, and also since the cause of all things can not be lacking in any 
existing quality, this supreme cause or God must be of our own 
nature, mind and will. As to just what the significance of mind is, 
Locke is not clear; what is made evident is that it is a notion sub- 
jectively derived and then assumed to account for the regulated 
character of external nature. 

Berkeley, developing to a further stage Locke's thesis that all 
knowledge is limited to ideas derived from experience, discards sub- 
stance, which Locke had retained as the material substratum of 
ideas, and with it any objective principle of connection. For we 
possess no idea of unity, but only a ' notion ' of the same, hence there 
can be no external reality corresponding to it. The corporeal world 
is in this way reduced to a system of ideas, and hence for Berkeley 
the problem of its purposive character presents no difficulties. This 
system of ideas constitutes a cosmos. There is change and there is 
order of succession in the change. Since it is obvious that our own 
minds or wills do not control these ideas, Berkeley proceeds to infer 
the existence of an incorporeal cause or spirit as the author of the 
world harmony. What are known as laws of nature are really laws 
of this spirit. This notion of a supreme mind is based upon the 

1 ' Essay/ Book IV., Chap. I., Sec. 2. 
2 Loc. cit., Book IV. 



EPISTEMOLOGICAL 21 

doctrine of a subjective agent, a spiritual entity in which ideas in- 
here, which Berkeley had retained when rejecting a corporeal sub- 
stance. 

Hume, carrying to its logical outcome the thesis that all ideas are 
ultimately traceable to sense impressions, finds that upon this basis 
there can exist no formative principle of events, no essential unity, 
no real knowledge beyond immediate sensations and the memory of 
these. 

After banishing Locke's material substance, Berkeley had still 
held to a substantial, spiritual entity. Advancing a step farther 
along the same line, Hume shows that the existence of mind, a sub- 
stantial unity, is an untenable hypothesis. For no impression from 
which this idea arises can be discovered; analysis discloses what is 
designated as mind to be a mere * bundle of perceptions,' with no 
principle of connection to constitute a unity. Similarly, necessary 
connection as an essential constituent of the law of causality turns 
out upon examination to be a mere figment of the imagination, a 
gratuitous construction, with no basis in reality. Experience pre- 
sents elements in contiguity and succession, but perception reveals 
no idea of any necessary connection. With the abolishment of any 
essential synthesis of the contents of ideas, or the objects of knowl- 
edge, Hume is compelled to seek elsewhere for the explanation of 
what must be accorded complexities of our experiences and the 
apparent order and uniformity of nature. For reflection can not 
conceive experience as a chaotic jumble of elements or as an indis- 
criminate sequence of events. 

This explanation of the unity prevailing in the practical world 
is gained by reference to the psychological processes of association 
and habit. In the case of the law of causality, repetitions of 
sequences give rise to the feeling of necessity that upon the appear- 
ance of one event a particular successor will follow. Thus necessity 
reduces to a habit of human nature, a tendency of the mind to pass 
from one event to another, but indicates no connection between the 
events themselves. It is a relation between ideas as psychical exist- 
ences, not as contents or objects of knowledge. No real consequence 
can be demonstrated; arbitrary sequence is all that can be asserted. 
Hume stops with this negative conclusion ; an inquiry into the logical 
ground of this belief in necessity does Q01 BUggest itself. 

With respect to the teleological conception of nature, 1 1 nine dis- 
cards the compromise between science and religion as effected by 
Locke and Berkeley. From the standpoint of an empirical epis- 
temology the argument for design can not be maintained on rational 
grounds. The assertion of the absolute order and harmony of the 



22 TEE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

world is unwarranted by the facts of experience. Apart from 
strictly rational considerations Hume does find that the view of a 
supreme force regulating the events of the world appears to be 
pertinent to nature. 

Kant's position is fundamentally influenced by the acceptance of 
the two-world theory of experience, although its form is an essential 
modification of any hitherto expounded. In accordance with Hume 
there is the initial assumption of an external reality presented 
through the medium of sensation. But Hume's consequent conclu- 
sion, the ultimate reduction of all knowledge to the passive flux of 
isolated sense impressions, can not be accepted. Our experience of 
objects is an indubitable fact, knowledge exists, science exists. 
Necessary connection, principles of unification, synthetic processes, 
not only do take place, but must be operative, since they constitute 
the very conditions of knowledge. Without a formative principle 
no object of knowledge would be possible. Since this synthesis, 
which must be accorded universal and necessary, is incapable of 
being derived from sensation, marked as this is with particularity and 
contingency, Kant concludes that it must be referred to the activity 
of an internal subjective element, mind. 

External reality in itself can never be an object of knowledge. 
The office of sensation is limited to furnishing the stimulus which 
excites the formative activity. That is, by means of sensations is 
presented the raw material, absolutely unformed, upon which the 
shaping process operates, and wanting which it can not be effect- 
ive. Even to recognize a sensation as such involves relationship, 
synthesis. To determine the various modes of synthesis which con- 
stitute the objects of experience and which are the preconditions of 
all science is the task of the ' Critique of Pure Reason. ' 

The primary, general conditions of any object at all are the 
forms of intuition, space and time. These are the pure forms of 
perception, the manner in which the theoretical reason operates to 
combine the manifold of sensation into perceptions. 

But nature is not a mere aggregate of perceptions. The existence 
of any particular object as well as the relation of objects with each 
other involves a further stage of synthesis. Mere flux, alternations 
of sensations, could never result in an object or knowledge. For 
these particulars to be held together, an abiding element is required, 
a principle of connection, an intelligence. This it is which con- 
stitutes the 'ego,' 'the transcendental unity of apperception,' 'the 
self.' That faculty whereby the creative activity combines the 
elements of perception into the complexities of the world of experi- 
ences is termed the 'understanding.' The 'pure understanding' sup- 



EPISTEMOLOGICAL 23 

plies the concepts which are at the basis of those relations of objects 
described in physical science, the concepts which underlie the system 
of the world. Thus it may be said the 'understanding prescribes 
laws to nature. ' The objective world of experience is a phenomenal 
world, a construction of the theoretical reason. 

In agreement with Hume, Kant denies the conception of design 
as a principle implied in the constitution of nature. On theoretical 
grounds the validity of the deistic conception is incapable of being 
established upon the basis of the nature of this objective world. 
But as a regulative conception, as a principle of the reflective 
reason, Kant finds the teleological conception useful and justifiable. 
That is, it is a way of considering things which the mind finds 
indispensable to a complete interpretation of the world. To under- 
stand nature, our intelligence must view it as if it were regulated 
by design. Thus the conception has its existence only in the mind, 
it is subjective in the Kantian sense. 

From the consideration of this position it is apparent that if we 
would determine what must be regarded as rationally valid in the 
teleological conception, or what in the Kantian philosophy must be 
deemed a principle of the constitutive reason, the query which will 
guide us resolves itself into, What are those features inherent in the 
objective world (objective in the Kantian sense) which permit and 
compel this way of viewing things if they would be comprehended? 

In the 'Critique of Judgment' Kant analyzes the concept of pur- 
pose to some extent, and marks the distinction between Zweck (end) 
and Ziueckmcissigkeit (adaptation to end, or purpose). Zweck 
(end) is a conception which contains the ground of the activity of 
an object. " Zweckmassigkeit (purpose) is the agreement of a thing 
with a character which is only possible in accordance with ends." 

Kant suggests that it is analogy with our own psychological ac- 
tivity which lies at the basis of the conception. Now, in two in- 
stances is there presented this characteristic which must be regarded 
as purposive; in the unity and uniformity of the world, and in 
organic beings. 

In order that the world may be known, in order that scientific 
research may proceed, it is necessary to conceive nature 'as if a 
reason were at the basis of the unity in multiplicity manifested in 
her empirical laws.' 1 That is, an activity analogous to human 
causality is postulated to render intelligible the fact of control which 
is implied in the view that the world is a systematic unity. 

Again, organic activity must be regarded as regulated with refer- 
ence to ends since the parts and the whole in organic beings can 

1 ' Critique of Judgment.' 



24 TEE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

not be understood independently of each other. The production of 
the whole organism is determined by the parts and, conversely, the 
production of the parts is influenced by each other and by the whole. 
This reciprocal determination, Kant holds, is rendered comprehen- 
sible only on the supposition of an intelligence which acts as if it had 
a purpose in view. 

Consideration of both these instances of purposiveness, the unity 
of the cosmos and organic products, leads us to conclude that that 
characteristic which is allowed to be an essential element of the ob- 
jective world, and which the subjective conception is evoked to 
explain, is a connection of dependence among elements, such a 
relation of particulars as is conducive to a definite result. What 
the position further maintains is, that to comprehend this fact it 
is requisite to entertain a conception analogous to psychological 
activity, that is, a determination by means of a preconceived idea. 
It is this opinion which has led Kant to designate the conception of 
purpose, as applied to the world, subjective. What the above 
analysis of purpose has warranted us in retaining as an essential 
trait of the world is the fact of control as a specific relation between 
events, which relation is the ground of its systematic nature. It 
must be remembered, however, that the objective world according 
to Kant is really a subjective construction, hence this determining 
element in nature in the last instance is the work of mind. 

The post-Kantian idealistic movement, developed in the systems 
of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, destroyed the transcendent cosmic 
reality which Kant had maintained as the cause of sensations, the 
unknown matter which was indispensable to the exercise of the 
activity of reason. Hence the entire phenomenal world is referred 
to consciousness or reason, either as its creation or as existence iden- 
tical with it, according to the particular view of consciousness enter- 
tained. In the philosophy of Fichte, the transcendent absolute ego 
determines itself in its unconscious creation of the non-ego or ex- 
ternal object. Control of the object becomes a determination of 
self. Schelling conceives both ego and non-ego, mind and nature, 
to be the product of a superior, mysterious transcendent principle, 
the identity of contraries. Finally, as a last phase of this movement, 
Hegel asserts that neither mind nor matter is transcendent ; both are 
simply successive stages in the one process of reality. The world 
of experience is just this evolution of consciousness; reason is 
developing reality. Consciousness, however, is not identical with 
any human faculty, as Kant had asserted it to be, but constitutes the 
law of all being. It is the same principle which legislates in both 
nature and mind, although conscious of itself in the latter. Thus 



EPISTEMOLOGICAL 25 

does the principle of order become the ground of the objective, the 
external, which it determines ; and its operation is the affirmation of 
the other and the subsequent control of it by the inclusion of its 
product within itself. 

Coming down to the present-day philosophical movement known 
as pragmatism, we find a fundamental importance attached to the 
notion of control. This theory advances upon the presupposition 
that reality must be identified with experience, and that experience 
is dynamic and continuous in its movement. Moreover, the experi- 
ence process is not adequately described as a mere flux of the given, 
an aggregate of successive events, a conjunction of accidentals. The 
movement is an evolution, each event is a stage in a process, one 
occurrence is the outcome of another; that is, determination and 
restraint are essential characteristics of it. The urgency of recog- 
nizing and accounting for control is manifested in the fact that it 
has given rise to one of the main problems of pragmatic epistemology, 
namely, to explain the determination in an experience process with- 
out recourse to any principle extraneous to that process. Direction 
of the experience movement is predicated, and the element which 
exercises this guiding function must, according to the basal assump- 
tions, be wholly immanent. Thus experience is conceived to be a 
^/"-evolving process, a ^/-maintaining activity, and the controlling 
factor must be sought within these limits. Now, that element which 
guides activities without going beyond the boundaries of experience 
is, according to pragmatism, knowledge. Hence knoAvledge is essen- 
tially an instrument, an instrument of control whose office is the 
directing of the movements of experience in so far as these are 
other than accidental. Thought is one among other functions of 
experience and exhibits its peculiar nature in determining the other 
characteristics. It follows as a consequence of this doctrine, that 
irrespective of a life process control is meaningless. 

In order to determine the significance of control in this theory, 
to discover just how thought operates as control, let us examine the 
pragmatic account of knowledge. 

It is maintained that since knowledge is essentially instrumental, 
a function in the process of experience, the consideration of its 
genesis and consequence is imperative for its comprehension. 
Thought always arises in a situation which may be described as 
unsatisfactory, the elements of which are in tension one with another. 
In order that activity may proceed, a reorganization is demanded. 
To meet this want the idea arises as an interpretation of the dis- 
crepant situation, as a defining of the incompatible elements. Now 
it is the very essence of such interpretation to lead to a harmonious 



26 TEE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

or unified experience. For in making explicit the end which must 
be attained if activity is to go on, there is involved at the same 
time the tendency toward the realization of the goal conceived, the 
directing of activity to its achievement. 1 

Thus we obtain the thesis that the idea, being primarily a plan 
of action or purpose, controls movement, in its quality of reference 
to an end. The idea as purpose is coincident with the tendency 
toward a specific future experience or event, as contrasted with a 
mere happening. Control, then, reduces to a relation between two 
events of experience such that one (the idea) brings about the 
existence of the other (a fulfillment). 

In this description of the thought function it appears that there 
are two determining circumstances exclusive of knowledge. The 
idea itself is somehow conditioned by the antecedent biological situa- 
tion, and the experience, which is the outcome of the purpose, is 
likewise dependent upon some additional fact not contained in the 
idea. "The conditions out of which the idea as purpose arises 
determine also the fulfillment possible. ' ' That is, the idea implies a 
prior fact, transcendent of experience, by virtue of which its 
character is determined. And again, the idea, arising in this man- 
ner, is only determinative, and constitutes a knowledge if it issues 
in a completing, satisfying experience. For the objective is such 
by virtue of the fact that it controls. Now if this resulting situation 
is not wholly dependent for its character upon the idea, it is 
obviously influenced by a factor independent of experience. Since 
it is only upon the actual occurrence of the anticipated event that 
the idea is said to be effective, it seems that knowledge as control is 
itself influenced by some extraneous element. Just what part this 
influence plays, its relation to knowledge as control, or the expres- 
sion of any implications it may contain, must be deferred to a later 
stage of this discussion. 

The general account of the thought process sketched above em- 
braces all varieties of knowledge, both the critical or scientific and 
the barely cognitive processes. Since the more involved operations 
may include and emphasize features which are lacking in the simpler 
cases, it would facilitate the attempt to reveal the essential character 
of control as exercised in knowledge if attention were confined to 
the type in which the least possible degree of complexity existed. 
Subsequent consideration of the more involved operations would 
disclose any additional characteristics introduced. 

In a recent article by Professor Dewey there is presented an 
analytic description of a knowledge as such. 2 In this account the 

1 Gathered from c Studies in Logical Theory/ John Dewey. 

2 ' The Experimental Theory of Knowledge/ Mind, N. S., Vol. XV., No. 59. 



EPISTEMOLOGICAL 27 

distinction between a cognitive and a cognitional experience is 
emphasized and their differentiae exposed. 

That which is denominated a cognitive thing is the simplest type 
of a knowledge. Let us consider the concrete case cited in illustra- 
tion of a cognitive experience: a smell which leads to action, the 
plucking of a rose. The experience which designates this sequence 
of events an evolution, the final act a result of the first occurrence, 
is a cognitive experience. Meaning, 'intellectual force and function ' 
are attributed to the smell by virtue of its relation to the subsequent 
event, the presence of the flower. The smell means the flower. Now 
it is important to lay stress upon the fact that it is only retro- 
spectively or ab extra that meaning or purpose is attributed to the 
smell. The smell in its original existence was not experienced as a 
smell, was not an idea, but mere fact. The idea knows the smell 
as smell because it is related to some other thing, the flower. With 
this description in mind, our problem takes the form of determining 
the locus of the controlling principle in experience, of discovering in 
just what the directing function inheres. Undoubtedly it is the 
cognitive experience (the retrospective experience) which affirms 
the determining relation between the two elements, the smell mean- 
ing the rose. But does it not make this assertion, is it not a knowl- 
edge, because of its recognition of a transitional experience inde- 
pendent of the knowledge of it? The controlling element, then, 
must reside in the immediate transitional experience, the connecting 
link between the elements, and not in the cognitive experience. 
Knowledge appears to be grounded in control, in the relation, rather 
than control in knowledge. 

Up to this point, then, we find that there is no question of 
thought as control. The instrumental function of knowledge is 
yet to be evinced. To revert to the illustration : the smell recurring 
may consciously intend the flower, may 'mean to mean' a certain 
terminating experience. This 'cognitional experience is contempo- 
raneously aware of meaning something beyond itself; it sets up an 
ideal to be realized. That the meaning so intended is actually 
effective can only be affirmed after the resulting experience has 
verified it. When so validated the idea is held to be true. Accord- 
ing to the experimental theory, a true idea is one whose conscious 
intention has been found to terminate in realization. Our query now 
becomes, Just where does the transformatory or reconstructive func- 
tion of thought enter in this second type of a knowledge? The 
answer is, In its capacity for supplying meanings which may be 
purposeful. This it is able to do because of its predication of deter- 
minations which have been operative, i. e., because of a previous 



28 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

cognitive experience. Knowledge serves to lend direction to the 
process of experience in so far as it enters into the intentional pur- 
pose or meaning. The content of a cognitive experience may be 
made, consciously made, the incitement to action, and is thereby 
instrumental in determining experience to the extent that it is 
capable of expressing ideas which will operate; and to just this 
degree is experience 'a consciously effected evolution.' That an 
intended purpose will be effective can never be a matter of certainty ; 
probability, in varying degrees, is the utmost which can be legiti- 
mately affirmed. 

As a result of this analysis, it appears that knowledge as a 
knowledge never directly controls experience. An idea in function- 
ing presents no elements which can be distinguished from determina- 
tion in experience, which was unaccompanied by any awareness of 
its constraining nature. As an impulse to a specific action the idea 
regulates that movement in a manner similar to that of any non- 
logical impulse. In a secondary sense knowledge may be said to 
be determinative in so far as it indirectly influences a future impetus 
to action, by reason of its capacity for supplying the content of ideas 
and thus modifying impulse. That is, knowledge controls in so 
far as it reflects and harmonizes with a transcendent determination. 
Experience is a ^/-determined process to the extent that there is 
a recognition and utilization of an extraneous control. 



CHAPTER III 



BIOLOGICAL 



In times past and present theories of vitalism have been and are 
asserted which claim to account for certain peculiarities of the 
organic world which are incapable of explanation by mechanical 
principles. While the formulations of the theory have undergone 
modifications with the development of biological science, the logic of 
the argument remains generally the same. Thus in earlier times 
a special vital force was presupposed to account for such features 
as the orderly, structure of the living organism, the process of 
development and the adaptation of organ to function. This specific 
energy constituted something supermechanical in nature, not sub- 
ject to the laws of matter and motion, and, according to certain 
formulations, accomplished its work through a preconceived ideal. 

But vitalistic theories, both those which have ceased to attribute 
a human intelligence to the extramechanical agent and the earlier 
formulations, are prone to be stigmatized as unscientific. What, 
then, is the ground of those objections which regard such reasoning 
as a false step in scientific procedure? The import of these criti- 
cisms, I take it, may be stated as follows : Vitalism must of necessity 
be worthless as a means of explanation since its method of procedure 
contains within it an inherent inconsistency. With the exposure of 
this inconsistency, vitalism as a scientific theory falls to the ground. 
It is due to a failure to appreciate the significance of mechanical 
explanation. Let it be granted for the sake of argument that there 
are distinguishing organic features, such as, for instance, the har- 
monious functioning of the organism. What vitalism presupposes 
in this case is an entity to account for such an arrangement of the 
material constituents as induced such a result. That is, in lieu of 
the forces which describe physicochemical processes, it asserts a prin- 
ciple which it holds to be specifically different, but which actually 
is assumed for the purpose of exercising the same function. Thus 
vitalism, in so far as it is explanation, resolves into mechanical 
explanation, and as such ceases to merit attention as a different 
method of interpretation, but must stand its ground similarly with 
any scientific hypothesis. 

However, if vitalism proves superfluous as a method of explana- 
tion, it may contribute something of value if it calls attention to what 
have been considered those distinguishing features of living things 

29 



30 TEE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

which have suggested the need of explanation specifically different 
from that obtaining in non- vital nature. If the development of bio- 
logical science, with its increased accuracy in the description of vital 
processes, has tended to remove the ground for the assertion of 
peculiar vital characters, yet the investigation of them is of service 
in the present study since it has been conducive to the analysis of 
those features which they were invoked to explain. 

Thus, it is the contention of a modern vitalist 1 that the creative 
synthesis of the organism, its harmonious functioning, is a unique 
attribute of living nature, in that it implies the possession of quali- 
ties by the whole which the parts do not display. The objector 
opposes, and we must add justifiably so, that this constitutes no cri- 
terion of difference between the two realms of nature. Every com- 
plex, inorganic as well as organic, possesses qualities which are 
wanting in its constituent elements. The attributes of water are 
essentially different from those of hydrogen and oxygen. 

The subject of development may detain us somewhat longer, not 
because it requires an extramechanical entity to render it compre- 
hensible, but because it has not so readily been paralleled in physico- 
chemical description. A recent statement of an opinion of the gen- 
eral drift of research with respect to this subject may help to dis- 
close the nature of those facts of which theories of development must 
take account. To quote: ''The germ consists of two elements, one 
of which undergoes a development that is essentially epigenetic, 
while the other represents an original controlling and determining 
element. The first is represented by the protoplasm of the egg. 
The second is the nucleus, which, as I have attempted to show, must 
apparently be conceived as a kind of microcosm or original preforma- 
tion consisting of elements which correspond, each for each, to 
particular facts of characters of the future organism." 2 

We are not here concerned with the problem as to whether epi- 
genesis or preformation or both be the proper explanation of develop- 
ment. What is to be observed is, that all the theories are advanced 
to account for a particular series of events, such a series as must be 
described as a process of development. That is, these theories indi- 
cate the necessity of explaining mechanically (i. e., in terms of 
matter and motion) what must otherwise be conceived as a process 
controlled and determined. The future organism is somehow the 
resultant of original elements. There is an identical factor in the 
individual stages which constitutes them a connected series. Should 
development take place by the addition of parts (epigenesis), yet 
each stage of growth is not merely new, not absolutely unrelated to 

1 Dries ch. 

2 E. B. Wilson, ' The Problem of Development/ Science, February, 1905. 



BIOLOGICAL 31 

the foregoing, since this new must be looked upon as conditioned to 
some extent by the prior stage ; thus the changing series of states is 
designated an evolution. 

If it prove that development is capable of analogy in inorganic 
nature, the fact of development remains unaltered and, if the above 
conception be sound, must stand. 

But it is primarily in the explanation of the phenomena of 
adaptation that biology has emphasized its peculiar need for the 
employment of the conception of purpose. To the recognition of this 
peculiarity (whatever its nature may turn out to be) may be traced 
the impetus which leads writers on natural theology to employ it 
as a basis for the 'argument for design. ' When Paley compares the 
eye to a human contrivance, it is its adaptation, its capacity for see- 
ing, that makes the analogy hold. Its structure is an adjustment to 
a specific environment. 

For a profoundly suggestive philosophical treatment of this sub- 
ject, I refer to the volume of Professor Brooks. 1 In it the author 
contends that the distinction between the works of non-vital nature 
and those of life is useful and justifiable, and finds that distinctive 
character to be expressed by such terms as fitness, use, adjustment, 
adaptation. 

To quote : ' ' Living things are preeminently distinguished by 
what is best expressed by the word fitness; they are adjusted to the 
world around them in such a way as to force us to believe that the 
use to which their organization is put has in some way been the 
controlling factor of their organization." Darwin has described the 
method according to which adaptation has arisen, when he expounded 
his theory of the origin of species by means of natural selection. 
But in presenting- this mechanical explanation of adaptation he has 
not disposed of fitness, and this is the fact to be interpreted. 

Xow fitness must be apprehended as a relation, a relation between 
the responsive organism and external nature, such as tends to preser- 
vation. And it must be observed that it is not primarily the indi- 
vidual that exhibits the favorable response which is benefited by it, 
nor primarily the organism in which the adjustment manifests itself 
which is preserved from injury or destruction ; but otherwise. The 
impulse which leads to reproduction and achieves its end, the perpet- 
uation of the species, frequently does so at the expense of the 
parents' life. To cite one among numerous concrete cases of migra- 
tion, we may refer to the salmon. In the prime of its strength it 
leaves its abode in the ocean and, struggling against almost insuper- 
able obstacles, finally arrives at the mountain stream which is to 

1 ' The Foundations of Zoology.' 



32 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

serve as the breeding-ground. There, having accomplished its end, 
the establishment of offspring, its life is done. Nor does this present 
anything anomalous in living nature. Thus it is maintained: "In 
all cases, the structure, habits, instincts and faculties of living 
things, from the upward growth of the plumule of the sprouting 
seed to the moral sense of man, are primarily for the good of other 
beings than the ones that manifest them. ' n 

And here we are confronted with an important point. Fitness 
involves the continued existence of that which is fit. If the being 
which survived the favorable response were not in some sense iden- 
tical with the one which manifested the useful quality, there could 
be no such thing as adaptation. Since, as stated above, the indi- 
vidual whose survival is due to a favorable attribute is frequently 
other than the one possessing the useful quality, in what does this 
identity reside? Evidently, in the species. The relationship of 
adjustment is exhibited in the series of individuals, but not in any 
single individual of the series. Similarly, when we predicate fitness 
of an individual organism, the continuity inheres in the variety of 
changing instances of the individual life, and in particular cases 
underlies what is known as personal identity. That is, fitness in- 
volves genetic continuity, a permanent factor, an intelligible prin- 
ciple in the history of living beings. 

Should the particular means by which species have been brought 
about prove to be ' mutation (the sudden and spontaneous production 
of new forms from the old stock) ' 2 or the gradual accumulation of 
fluctuating variations, the above position is unaffected. Both 
theories endeavor to account for adaptation' 3 and what it implies, 
progressive evolution in the organic world, a process wherein only 
the survivals count ; these accumulating in the course of its procedure 
constitute a history in living nature. 

The fact that change in living nature must be conceived to take 
place under certain limitations constitutes the foundation of the 
problem of heredity. A theory of evolution must explain two classes 
of facts, first, the production of new forms of life, and, secondly and 
primarily, the repetition and preservation of type. The particular 
means by which heredity is effected appears to be an unsettled ques- 
tion of biology. It is held, on the one hand, that it is impossible to 
explain the repetition of ancestral form on the theory of the inherit- 
ance of individual adaptation to environment ; and again, it is main- 
tained by some scientists that natural selection is inadequate to ex- 
plain the whole phenomenon. What this moot position does indicate 

1 Loc. cit. 

2 De Vries. 

3 Adaptation has been used to signify favorable variation. 



BIOLOGICAL 33 

is the fact that all the theories of heredity find it necessary to explain 
the conservation of type, the fact that the new in living nature is not 
entirely new, but is a transformation of the old. 

To sum up the results of the discussion : There is in living nature 
that which must be conceived as a tendency toward the attainment 
of something beyond the present individual's existence. This tend- 
ency, involving a permanent element in a changing series, makes for 
accumulation, thus resolving the succession into a history. Other- 
wise stated, there is a principle of control at the basis of the organic 
world which gives it the character of a progress or evolution. Or- 
ganic evolution is an indication of a determining factor since it 
involves conservation or limiting conditions of occurrence. 



CHAPTER IV 



MECHANISM 



The modern scientific view of nature repeats the observation of 
Heraclitus of old,— all things change. But that the flux is calcu- 
lable, that happenings take place in such a way that prediction of 
them is to an extent possible, that laws of change may be formulated, 
these facts constitute the very foundation of physical theory. 
Mechanism is the scheme for describing and explaining physical 
processes, and the existence of the mechanical theory of nature pre- 
supposes and involves a certain determination of occurrence, a 
regulation in change. In fact, mechanism is in essence a detailed 
expression of control. The fundamental postulate, upon which 
science advances, is that there is some constant amid all variation. 
For did mere change, unrelated elements, embrace the whole of the 
physical Avorld, science would be impossible. Did observation dis- 
close nothing permanent in alteration, laws of nature could not be 
constructed. Scientific investigation no less than ordinary observa- 
tion asserts the interdependence of phenomena, and natural laws are 
formulated to describe these connections. 

Let us see how physical science conceives control (tacitly, if not 
explicitly), and to this end examine some of the actual constructions 
as embodied in its basal concepts and principles. Before entering 
into this, however, since the object of physical theory generally is 
the formulation of laws, it is pertinent to inquire, What is the 
significance of a natural law? 

Modern writers on the logic of science have called attention to 
the economical and practical character of natural laws. As an 
abridged statement, a concise arrangement of a large number of 
facts, a law facilitates thought in its endeavor to attain a compre- 
hensive grasp of things. The data of which a law is an abstract 
formula are relations which obtain between elements or groups of 
elements. Observation discovers particular sequences of happen- 
ings, and a law in its descriptive quality resumes these sequences in a 
simple formula. In order that such a resume may be effected, there 
must have existed as a prerequisite repetitions of similarities in the 
phenomena observed. That is, there is a constant factor in the 
variety of particular sequences and it is this identical feature which 
a law enunciates and which constitutes a specific relation. 

It is obvious that a relation of succession, the outcome of empir- 

34 



MECHANISM 35 

ical data, does not exhaust the character of a law. A law implies 
such a sequence to be a consequence. The later happening is viewed 
as a result of a previous occurrence, and this in turn is regarded as a 
determining condition of the subsequent event. Otherwise stated, 
a law formulates a specific method of change. To this property of 
expressing a determining principle, the practical nature of a law 
may be traced. Thus one writer defines a law ' as a constant relation 
between the phenomena of to-day and those of to-morrow.' 1 Not 
only a past order is described, but prediction of future events may 
be made with confidence, and all such prophecy has its ground in the 
principle of uniformity. For every law is a generalization and as 
such involves the postulate of uniformity, and uniformity is simply 
an expression of the logical necessity for predicating control in the 
processes of nature. 

It has been said that science makes legitimate prediction possible, 
and experience in the past has served to justify such prophecy. 
Now we have observed that all statements with regard to the future 
have their basis in the postulate of uniformity, and the question 
arises, AYhat is the foundation of this conception? Is there, as it 
has sometimes been affirmed, any proof of the view that no arbitrary 
change can take place in nature? The answer to this query leads 
us to speak of the theory of probability and the part it plays (more 
or less consciously) in physical induction. 

Of a future event there can be no certain knowledge ; nor are we 
consigned to absolute ignorance in this regard. Probability, a degree 
of knowledge or ignorance, is our portion and constitutes the basis 
and outcome of all research. Now every statement of probability 
in physical science is based upon an hypothesis, upon the conviction 
of continuity in the processes of nature. Without this assumption 
no inference as to the probability of occurrence would be possible. 
Granting this thesis, we have now to consider the view which main- 
tains that uniformity is not merely an assumption indispensable for 
scientific constructions, not solely a conviction necessary for practise, 
but that this concept has also a demonstrable foundation in experi- 
( nee. 

The probability of an event is defined as the ratio between the 
number of favorable cases and the whole number of equally possible 
cases. It is important to note that in this definition the latter clause, 
the whole number of equally possible cases, is itself an expression 
of probability. And, consequently, if any specific probability is to 
be entirely a matter of experiment, the basis for the .statement 
respecting the equal possibility of the total number of cases must 

1 Poincar£, ' Science and Hypothesis.' 



36 TEE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

be disclosed. The argument which claims to demonstrate uniformity 
by means of the calculus of probability may be briefly set forth as 
follows: Cases of non-uniformity have either never occurred or, 
admitting their existence, their number has been relatively so small 
as to be negligible in the argument. That is, the number of cases 
favorable to uniformity has been practically coextensive with experi- 
ence. We come now to the second term of the ratio, the number of 
equally possible cases of uniformity. Whence does experience derive 
its knowledge of these ? The answer to this point forms the crux of 
the argument. Karl Pearson 1 proceeds upon the basis of Laplace's 
theory that 'in cases where we are ignorant of the condition of the 
possible cases, there in the long run all constitutions will be found 
to be equally probable. ' Then, comparing the number of favorable 
cases with the number of equally possible cases, we obtain that high 
degree of probability of uniformity which amounts to practical 
certainty. A little attention to the thesis of Laplace discovers that 
it simply begs the question which is the subject of proof. By what 
train of reasoning is the fact established that all constitutions are 
found to be equally probable in cases where we are ignorant? Is it 
not obvious that this theory is derived by means of that very cal- 
culus of probability, with its implied assumption as to knowledge 
of the equal possibility of all the cases, which it is pretending to 
demonstrate? That is, this proof of uniformity is based upon the 
postulate of some principle controlling occurrence, and hence the 
argument for its experimental basis falls to the ground. Similarly 
it will be found that those theories which profess to explain the 
constitution of an ordered world upon a basis of pure chance always 
employ tacitly, if not openly, some principle of determination upon 
which the force of the demonstration depends. Control is a postu- 
late logically necessary to the existence of order, but is never merely 
a result of physical induction. 

Let us now turn to some of the constructions of physical science. 

Mechanical theory was wont to describe phenomena in terms of 
matter and motion. These two ultimate conceptions were specific 
designations of the permanent and the changing, the two irreducible 
facts involved in all the complexities of physical science. With the 
development of physical science, the concept of matter has under- 
gone modifications in order to comply with an increasing accuracy 
and refinement of description; but throughout the whole variety of 
postulates we find an adherence to the notion of the permanent. 
Thus in an early stage of its history matter was defined as an entity 
qualified by existence in space and time. When a later concep- 

1 ' The Grammar of Science.' 



MECHANISM 37 

tion replaced these characteristics by the trait of impenetrability, it 
responded to the same general need, the expression of indestruc- 
tibility. A subsequent physics, finding this matter too gross for its 
requirements, proceeded to break it up successively into atoms, prime 
atoms, ions, etc. Despite the abandonment of spatial and temporal 
properties, the notion of the unchangeable is retained. The atoms 
were defined as indecomposable particles whose only motion is that 
of translation. Strain and rotation, changes in its internal nature, 
can not be ascribed to them. If the ion supersede the atom as the 
ultimate element, it is called forth to serve the same function, which 
is identical in all these conceptions and consists in the expression of 
the fact of inertia. 

In its first significance, motion designated change in matter as 
extensive. This concept gave way to force, an entity to express the 
cause of motion, while in the science of to-day force is conceived as 
a ratio of acceleration, and this means a specific description of 
variation. Thus these various conceptions of motion are shown to 
be diverse modes, more or less adequate, of indicating change. 

Finally, in the widest generalization of physical science, the 
principle of the conservation of energy, there are embraced facts both 
of fixity and of change ; and upon ultimate analysis this principle of 
energy reduces to the assertion that there exists a certain identical 
element throughout physical processes, a limiting factor in change. 

Mach says: 1 "If we estimate every change of physical condition 
by the mechanical work which can be performed upon the disappear- 
ance of that condition, and call this measure energy, then we can 
measure all physical changes of condition, no matter how different 
they may be, with the same common measure and say: The sum 
total of all energy remains constant." We look in vain in the text- 
books for a definition of energy. But we learn from such state- 
ments as the above that energy is measured by mechanical work. 
Now mechanical work is equivalent to change in the configuration of 
things. Energy, then, denotes the fact of change, or, rather, meas- 
urable change, such change as can be quantitatively determined. 
The conservation of energy is an affirmation of a quantitative 
identity maintained throughout all change. For we learn that 
energy has various forms, such as heat, light, electricity, magnetism, 
and that these are convertible ; that is, there is a definite relationship 
existing throughout all variation, a permanent element in the trans- 
formation. The great advance which mechanism has made in the 
explanation of phenomena is largely due to the fact that it is able to 
express its laws in the form of mathematical equations. Such quan- 

1 ' Popular Scientific Lectures,' translated by T. J. McCormack, 1898, p. 164. 



38 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

titative determination of change supplies a detailed account of the 
principle controlling nature. 

It is important to observe that the principle of the conservation 
of energy is not a truth experimentally derived. An inquiry into its 
origin and the employment of it in investigation discloses (as shown 
by Mach, Poincare and others) that it is an assumption logically 
necessitated in the explanation of physical processes and indispen- 
sable for scientific research. Experience verifies its existence, but 
can not originate the principle. Further, the whole force of this 
principle in physics necessitates that the principle determining 
change exists inherently in the process it characterizes. Were the 
principle regulating change located in a foreign agent, mechanism 
would be meaningless. 

The fundamental dimensions of physical science, mass, length 
and time, derive their significance from the fact that they tend to 
supply means of determining the exact conditions governing occur- 
rence, the quantitative limits within which change may take place. 
These dimensions are independent kinds of measurement, and as such 
constitute so many different ways of expressing relations between 
phenomena, of designating specific modes of interdependence. For 
measurement is the definition of one phenomenon by another, 1 and 
thus description of things in quantitative terms is rendered possible. 

To conclude, then, this investigation of the concept of control as 
evinced in mechanism: The general assumption of a regulation of 
occurrence forms the basis of mechanical explanation. The funda- 
mental constructions of physical science characterize the limiting 
factor of change as a permanent element in variation. As a de- 
scription of change in measurable terms, mechanism is compelled 
to assume a quantitative identity maintained throughout altera- 
tion. It is required that the determining factor exist inherently in 
the process it influences. 

1 Mach, op. cit., p. 206, note. 



CHAPTER V 



CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS 



Our study of these different instances illustrating the logical 
necessity of affirming control and the way in which this demand has 
been satisfied, reveals certain fundamental agreements and dis- 
similarities among the conceptions. Everywhere (i. e., in the cos- 
mological theories, in the epistemological conceptions, in the prin- 
ciples of biology and mechanism) there is the initial assumption 
of a world of change, and in all these cases there is the additional 
affirmation of definite movement involving an identical element in 
variation, a static principle in the dynamic flux, an intelligible 
feature in sensible existence. It may be said that pragmatism does 
not assert a permanent factor in the experience process ; but since it 
defines experience as an evolution, each stage the result of a previous 
condition, one situation or portion of experience a transformation 
of another, we feel justified in saying that the permanent is im- 
plied in this description, if not explicitly stated. 

The cosmological conception, pragmatic epistemology, the prin- 
ciples of biology and mechanism agree in placing the directive prin- 
ciple wholly within the movement it constitutes a process. That is, 
the determinate relation between elements is dependent for its 
nature upon the specific particulars it connects. It is manifested in 
individuals as a tendency toward results, it is a reference of elements 
to a dominating whole. 

In contrast, according to the epistemological movement termina- 
ting with Kant, the regulative principle has its origin in a source 
distinct from the material which it unifies. It is constituted a sub- 
jective activity, reason; while that which it influences is a cosmic 
reality. The history of thought succeeding this epistemological 
movement has disclosed the inconsistencies and paradoxes involved 
in the assumption of a dualism of realities, and thus has evinced 
the need of a different method of approaching the question. 

This leaves us with the moot problem : Is the principle of control 
a cosmological conception, or is it a function of human experience? 
Must it be designated a characteristic of a life process, or is it a meta- 
physical concept to which the psychological is subordinate as a spe- 
cial case? 

In the analysis of the conception of pragmatism, it was discovered 
that knowledge, a controlling function of experience, points to and 
involves a transcendent control, a determination independent of our 

39 



40 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 

experience of it. Further, it was maintained that knowledge is 
knowledge by virtue of this property of cognizing a metaphysical 
control, and exercises its peculiar function in rendering possible 
an intensification of a cosmical reality. If this position be accepted, 
psychological control becomes a particular instance of a general 
cosmical determination. 

As an outcome of this discussion of control, it appears that the 
concept when applied to reality results in two specific modes of 
describing the nature of things, distinguished by the terms employed. 
On the one hand, there is the qualitative aspect of nature, incapable 
of being adequately rendered in physical terms, and whose funda- 
mental nature is described in the category of purpose. I say pur- 
pose, for it seems that this term as used by Greek philosophy is best 
fitted to express the intelligible character of reality designated as a 
tendency toward results. Again, in mechanical explanation we 
have things described in their quantitative aspect, or in spatial or 
physical terms. It is obvious that these two modes of describing one 
fundamental feature of reality are not mutually exclusive nor con- 
tradictory, but coexist. Neither can be reduced to terms of the 
other; both are diverse but essential modes of denoting the same 
characteristic expressed in the concept of control. 

A word as to some current applications of the category.— The 
sciences of mechanics, economics and sociology, in investigating the 
laws of movement respectively describing their distinctive phe- 
nomena, include as a fundamental prerequisite the recognition of a 
set of static principles which present the conditions of equilibrium, 
or the unchanging. Mechanics has its department of statics, treat- 
ing of those principles of movement which are the condition of 
stability. The elaboration of these principles is a necessary antece- 
dent to the formulation of the kinetic laws, since these static prin- 
ciples constitute the controlling elements in the entire field of 
dynamics. Similarly, economics in its constructions of the laws 
governing the distribution of wealth in a changing social organiza- 
tion presents as an indispensable preliminary, in its theory of static 
social economics, the principles which would be operative in an 
unchanging world. Since existing society always is dynamic, these 
principles must be abstractions and can have no independent status. 
Nevertheless the static laws are actually dominant in the variations 
of wealth occurring in the development of society and constitute the 
standard to which fluctuations tend to conform. Sociology describes 
the process of society as a moving equilibrium. The laws which 
are found to govern social development embrace as a fundamental 
part social statics, the laws of social coexistence, the conditions which 
would maintain a social stability. 



VITA 

The author of this dissertation was born in New York City, in 
1874. She was graduated from Normal College, City of New York, 
in 1893. During the year 1902-1903 she studied at Teachers Col- 
lege, Columbia University, receiving- the degree of B.S. in 1903. 
During the years 1903-1907 she attended courses in philosophy and 
psychology at Columbia University under Professors Woodbridge, 
Dewey, Fullerton, Miller, Montague, Sheldon, Tawney and Thorn- 
dike; and received the degree of A.M. in 1904. 






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